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Buy It Now: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants Who 
Conduct Business Through Online Intermediaries 
 
Chris Rojao* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2008, e-commerce retail sales 
accounted for approximately 3.6% of all retail sales in the country and generated $142 billion in 
revenue.
1
  A study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates that in the same year, approximately 73% of all electronic retail sales were conducted 
through online retail intermediaries (“online intermediaries”).2  Online intermediaries facilitate 
internet transactions for new and used goods by connecting buyers with suppliers, and they 
provide a range of services such as a platform for auctions, fixed prices, and transaction 
processing.
3
  One of the largest online intermediaries is eBay.com.
4
  In June 2011, 223.5 million 
people accounting for 16.2% of the world’s Internet population visited eBay.5  The increasing 
use of the Internet and online intermediaries—like eBay—by manufacturers and sellers to 
distribute their products across the United States has posed significant problems for courts in 
determining where these manufacturers and sellers should be subject to personal jurisdiction 
when conflicts arise out of their transactions. 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2010, University of 
Richmond.  I would like to thank Professor Adam Steinman and Seton Hall Law Review Editors Eric Dante and 
Desiree Grace for their invaluable advice and comments during the editing process.  I would also like to thank my 
family, friends, and the F.A.C. for all of their support, without which none of this would be possible.  
1 E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf. 
2 KARINE PERSET, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES 7 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf. 
3 See id. at 12.  
4 See Dan Rowinski, Amazon’s Websites Saw 20% of the World’s Internet Users in June, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011/08/17/17readwriteweb-amazons-websites-saw-20-of-
the-worlds-inter-48335.html. 
5 Id.  
2 
 
State and federal courts have struggled with applying the traditional personal jurisdiction 
analysis and the other specialized test, the Zippo test, developed to deal specifically with 
establishing personal jurisdiction to Internet transactions through online intermediaries.
6
  This 
Comment analyzes the various approaches to establishing personal jurisdiction over businesses 
and individuals that conduct business through online intermediaries.  Part II discusses the 
development and expansion of personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff to International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.  Part III explains how some 
courts have applied these traditional principles to personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet 
activity and how others have developed a specialized test for personal jurisdiction with regard to 
Internet activity.  Part IV illustrates the problems that courts have faced in applying both the 
traditional principles of personal jurisdiction and the Zippo test for personal jurisdiction to out-
of-state defendants that conduct business through online intermediaries by analyzing relevant 
case law on the issue.  Part V establishes a new “online intermediaries test” that combines 
important elements of the Zippo sliding-scale test and the traditional minimum contacts analysis 
and is specifically tailored to Internet transactions conducted through online intermediaries.  Part 
VI applies this new “online intermediaries test” to actual and hypothetical scenarios in order to 
demonstrate its practicality.  Part VII concludes, urging courts to adopt this approach.  
II. Creation and Development of the Doctrinal Test for Establishing Personal Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is defined as “a government’s general power to exercise its authority over all 
persons and things within its territory.”7  This Comment focuses specifically on a court’s power 
to exercise its authority over an individual—personal jurisdiction.  A valuable explanation of the 
                                                 
6 See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the 
challenges that the Internet poses to personal jurisdiction analysis).  
7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009). 
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concept of personal jurisdiction in its early stage of development comes from the 1877 Supreme 
Court case Pennoyer v. Neff.
8
  The Court in Pennoyer explained that a person would not be 
bound by a court’s judgment unless the court had properly obtained power over that individual 
by statute and under the Constitution.
9
  In 1877, most state statutes provided that a court properly 
obtained power over an individual when that individual was either: (1) served with process 
within the territory of the state; or (2) voluntarily appeared to litigate in the state.
10
  The Court in 
Pennoyer brought personal jurisdiction analysis within the confines of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not 
constitute due process of law.”11  
As the United States began to grow and develop technologically, the expansion of 
interstate commerce and travel began to pose significant problems for courts trying to apply 
principles from Pennoyer.
12
  Many states responded by finding creative ways to assert 
jurisdiction.  One common example was for a state to pass a statute declaring that any individual 
driving on state highways consents to have the state appoint an agent for service of process.
13
  In 
Hess v. Pawloski, the Supreme Court explained that in order to be valid, these statutes must be 
consistent with the Due Process Clause.
14
  Then in 1945, the Supreme Court clarified this 
principle when it articulated a test for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, 
out-of-state defendants in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
15
  The Court established this 
                                                 
8 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
9 Id. at 732.  
10 Id. at 729–30. 
11 Id. at 733. 
12 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980) (noting that a change in personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is attributable to a “fundamental transformation in the American economy”).  
13 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164 (1916). 
14 Hess, 274 U.S. at 355.  
15 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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more flexible test based on a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state and the 
reasonableness of subjecting the defendant to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on those 
contacts.
16
  It also explained that it adopted this test to get rid of the “legal fiction” that 
defendants were impliedly consenting to jurisdiction by their “presence in the state through the 
acts of its authorized agents.”17  The Court found this test to be in accordance with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
18
  It stated that “due process requires only that in 
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”19  
In International Shoe, the Court also introduced the concepts of general jurisdiction and 
specific jurisdiction without expressly using these terms.
20
  The Court suggested that jurisdiction 
would apply to individuals and corporations with operations in a particular state that are so 
“continuous and systematic” that they could reasonably be subject to jurisdiction in that state, 
even for disputes that are distinct from those contacts.
21
  Nearly forty years later, in Helicopteros 
Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court identified this concept explicitly as 
“general jurisdiction.”22  Recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the 
Supreme Court refined the International Shoe standard to require that the contacts be so 
                                                 
16 Id. at 316.  
17 Id. at 318. 
18 Id. at 319. 
19 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
20 See id. at 318.  
21 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within 
a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).    
22 Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (“When a State exercises 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citing Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984)); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81 (1980).  Cf. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction 
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).    
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continuous and systematic as to render the defendant “essentially at home” in the forum state.23  
The Goodyear Court also explained that general jurisdiction typically exists where the individual 
is domiciled or the practical equivalent for a corporation.
24
   
While theoretically viable, the Supreme Court has only considered the issue of whether a 
defendant’s contacts with a forum state are so continuous and systematic as to subject him to 
general jurisdiction in that state in three decisions since International Shoe.
25
  Alternatively, 
specific jurisdiction is the legal principle that most plaintiffs invoke to subject an out-of-state 
defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum state.
26
  Specific jurisdiction requires that: (1) the 
defendant corporation or individual have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state; (2) 
the claim against him must arise out of, or relate to, those contacts; and (3) jurisdiction over the 
defendant must be reasonable.
27
  
Perhaps the main takeaway from International Shoe is that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants, provided that these prospective defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with 
that state so that bringing the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”28  In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated four factors for determining whether exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is fair and reasonable in World-Wide 
                                                 
23 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).  
24 Id. at 2853–54. 
25 See id., at 2846; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408; Perkins v. Bengeut Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
26 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849 (explaining that most of the Court’s decisions have focused on circumstances 
surrounding specific jurisdiction).  
27 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever the cause of 
action arises out of or relates to the contacts between the defendant and the forum.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate 
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough 
to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”). 
28 See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 323–24.  
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Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
29
  The factors included: (1) “the forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute”; (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies”; and (4) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.”30  In order for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants, however, it must have a statutory authority granting it the ability to reach 
out beyond its borders.
31
  Such statutes have become known as “long-arm statutes,”32  and in 
response to International Shoe, all fifty states have enacted these statutes or court rules that 
define the circumstances under which the state may exercise jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants.
33
  These statutes can be as expansive as extending the jurisdictional boundaries to the 
fullest extent allowable under the U.S. Constitution,
34
 or limited to requiring either an act or 
omission to occur within the state,
35
 or business to be transacted within the state.
36
  
Assuming that individuals and corporations are not subject to general jurisdiction, and 
provided that the state has a long-arm statute granting it jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants, the next question that courts were called upon to answer was: how many contacts 
would be enough to satisfy specific jurisdiction under the “minimum contacts” test from 
International Shoe?  The Supreme Court addressed this issue in McGee v. International Life 
                                                 
29 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
30 Id. at 292. 
31 Id. at 290–93.  
32 A long-arm statute is defined as “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has had 
contacts with the territory where the statute is in effect.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (9th ed. 2009).    
33 See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 
B. U. L. REV. 492, 493–96 (2004) (explaining the history and development of long-arm statutes in response to Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington). 
34 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any 
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”); N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4 (2010) (“[A]ny 
defendant may be served as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”). 
35 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 2010) (“A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has 
jurisdiction over a person . . . [i]n any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising 
out of an act or omission within this state by the defendant.”).   
36 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1993). 
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Insurance Co., in which an insurance company, through its regional office located in Texas, sold 
a life insurance policy to a California man.
37
  When the man died, the beneficiary of the policy, 
Ms. McGee, sued to enforce the policy in California.
38
  The Supreme Court held that one 
contact—the insurance contract—was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even though the 
company had no agents in California nor solicited any business there, because the contact was 
substantial and the dispute arose directly from that contact.
39
  
International Shoe and McGee were somewhat limited by the Court’s ruling in Hanson v. 
Denckla.
40
  In Hanson, a Pennsylvania woman established a trust with a Delaware corporation 
and subsequently moved to Florida.
41
  When she died, the beneficiaries of the trust tried to sue 
the Delaware corporation in Florida to enforce the agreement.
42
  The Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that Florida had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation, stating that “[t]he 
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state.”43  The Court went on to add an 
additional feature to International Shoe’s minimum contacts test, requiring “some act by which 
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”44  
This new requirement of purposeful availment created another issue for the courts as they 
tried to determine what type of conduct was sufficient to find that the defendant had purposefully 
availed itself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the forum state.  In World-Wide 
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a defendant purposefully avails himself 
                                                 
37 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 221–23. 
40 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
41 Id. at 238–39. 
42 Id. at 240.  
43 Id. at 253. 
44 Id. (emphasis added).  
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of the benefits and privileges of a forum state, merely because it is foreseeable that a product he 
sells may end up in that state.
45
    
Another mechanism for establishing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is 
often referred to as the “effects test” established in Calder v. Jones.46  This test is relevant to this 
Comment because some courts have applied it to Internet transactions conducted through online 
intermediaries.  In Calder, a famous singer-actor Shirley Jones filed a lawsuit in California 
against the National Enquirer and its writer—both located in Florida—for libel with regard to a 
story they published about her.
47
  The Supreme Court found that the story “concerned the 
California activities of a California resident. . . . was drawn from California sources, and the 
brunt of the harm . . . was suffered in California.”48  The Court also found that petitioners “edited 
an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they 
knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and 
works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.”49  The Court concluded 
that “[j]urisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their 
Florida conduct in California.”50  As a result of Calder, courts have found jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants when their conduct is an intentional action expressly aimed at the forum state 
and causes an injury or effect in the forum state.
51
   
In sum, the Supreme Court has articulated several elements necessary for a state to assert 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has not consented to its jurisdiction and 
does not have continuous and systematic contacts that expose him to general jurisdiction.  First, 
                                                 
45 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980).  
46 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
47 Id. at 784.  
48 Id. at 788–89.  
49 Id. at 789–90 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 789.  
51 See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998); Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 9 
(Cal. 2002).  
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the state must have a statutory grant of authority, usually in the form of a long-arm statute.
52
  The 
defendant must then have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he has 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of its laws.
53
  In addition, the claim 
against him must arise out of or relate to those minimum contacts.
54
  Finally, jurisdiction over the 
defendant must be reasonable so as to comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”55  This is essentially the framework that courts have attempted to apply to 
personal jurisdiction cases involving activity conducted over the Internet: an area where 
territorial boundaries of Internet activity are ambiguous, and an individual’s conduct may cause 
an effect in one state or every state almost instantaneously.   
III. The Beginning of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Establishing Jurisdiction Over 
Owners and Operators of Websites 
The establishment of the Internet and e-commerce caused significant problems for courts 
trying to apply the minimum contacts test to individuals who post information and conduct 
business over the web.
56
  Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. was one of the first cases to 
address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to activity conducted over the Internet.
57
  In 
this case, plaintiff Inset, a Connecticut corporation, sued defendant Instruction, a Massachusetts 
corporation with no employees or offices in Connecticut, for trademark infringement based on 
defendant using the name “Inset” in its website and phone number.58  The court applied the 
traditional minimum contacts analysis and found that the defendant had sufficient minimum 
                                                 
52 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1980); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
718 (1877). 
53 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
54 See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
55 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
56 See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of 
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 330–31 (2002). 
57 Inset Sys, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
58  Id. at 163 (noting that the defendant listed its website as www.inset.com and used a toll free phone number 1-
800-US-INSET).  
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contacts with Connecticut because defendant advertised over the Internet and through its toll-free 
number, which “reach[ed] as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone.”59  The 
court’s holding received harsh criticism and many courts chose not to apply this test because the 
underlying implication was that anyone advertising over the Internet could be subject to 
jurisdiction anywhere the website could be accessed.
60
  
The next case to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet 
communications and transactions was Zippo Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which 
adopted a more restrictive approach.
61
  In Zippo, a Pennsylvania manufacturing company sued a 
California Internet news service in Pennsylvania for trademark infringement based on its use of 
the name “Zippo” for its websites.62  The court aptly articulated the issue before it, stating, “we 
must decide the Constitutionally permissible reach of Pennsylvania’s Long Arm Statute . . . 
through cyberspace.”63  The court then reviewed the traditional principles of personal jurisdiction 
and found that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is 
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity.”64 
In its decision, the court articulated a sliding-scale test for determining whether an 
individual purposefully avails himself of a forum state based on his or her conduct over the 
internet.
65
  On one end of the spectrum are active websites where individuals enter into contracts 
and conduct business with residents of foreign jurisdictions.
66
  On the other end are passive 
websites where individuals merely post information that is accessible to others in foreign 
                                                 
59 Id. at 165.  
60 See, e.g., Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, S.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 n.10 (D.S.C. 2002); Digital Control, 
Inc. v. Boretronics, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
61 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
62 Id. at 1121.  
63 Id. at 1120–21. 
64 Id. at 1123–24 (emphasis added).  
65 Id. at 1124.  
66 Id. 
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jurisdictions.
67
  In the middle lie “interactive websites” where information is exchanged between 
the host computer and users of the website.
68
  The court indicated that jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants who maintain “active” websites would be proper, whereas jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants who maintain “passive” websites would not.69  With regard to “interactive” 
websites, courts would determine jurisdiction “by examining the level of interactivity and 
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”70 
The court explained that personal jurisdiction jurisprudence supports the notion that when 
individuals and corporations intentionally reach out to conduct business with residents of other 
states, jurisdiction in those states is proper, and this rationale should not change simply because 
the business is conducted over the Internet.
71
  Conversely, the court stated that an out-of-state 
defendant does not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the 
forum state because users must take it upon themselves to act upon that information, by calling 
the number on the site, for example.
72
  Additionally, the court cited Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 
Inc. as an example of a case involving an “interactive website” and relied on that court’s 
reasoning that the defendant’s website’s active solicitations, promotional activities, and 
responses to users accessing the site made jurisdiction proper.
73
   
Applying this test to the case before it, the district court found that defendant’s Internet 
news service websites were akin to “active” websites because they conducted substantial 
business over the Internet and provided passwords to “approximately 3,000 subscribers in 
Pennsylvania and entered into seven contracts with Internet access providers . . . in 
                                                 
67 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.  
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).  
72 Id. at 1125 (citing Bensusan Res. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).  
73 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124–25.  
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Pennsylvania.”74  Next, the court concluded that the claim arose out of the defendant’s conduct 
in Pennsylvania because “both a significant amount of the alleged infringement and dilution, and 
resulting injury . . . occurred in Pennsylvania.”75  Lastly, the court held that jurisdiction was 
reasonable in Pennsylvania because of the interest Pennsylvania had in adjudicating disputes 
over infringement of trademarks owned by its residents and the plaintiff’s interest in choosing to 
seek relief in the state.
76
  Accordingly, the court found that Pennsylvania had specific jurisdiction 
over the defendant.
77
 
Most district and circuit courts have incorporated some variation of the sliding-scale test 
articulated in Zippo, and some have even gone further to incorporate the requirement that 
defendants “expressly aim” or “target” the forum state through their Internet activities.78  Other 
courts have criticized the Zippo sliding-scale test or declined to apply it in favor of traditional 
personal jurisdiction analysis.
79
  Admittedly, the Pennsylvania District Court’s holding in Zippo 
was generally tailored to entities that run their own websites and use those websites to conduct 
business or to post information and advertisements.
80
  The question that still remains, which has 
haunted courts since the beginning of the twenty-first century, is what happens when the entity 
does not own the website itself, but instead conducts business or posts information over a 
website owned and operated by a third-party intermediary, such as eBay? 
 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1126. 
75 Id. at 1127. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 See, e.g., ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA 
Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Returning to the Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006) 
(analyzing cases that have applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to establish personal jurisdiction over the Internet). 
79 See, e.g., Instabook Corp. v. Instantpublisher.com., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124–25 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Howard v. 
Mo. Bone and Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
80 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.  
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IV. The Issue of Online Intermediaries: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Individuals 
Who Conduct Business Over eBay 
This Part will discuss cases that have used the Zippo “sliding scale” test, the traditional 
minimum contacts test, or a variation of the Calder “effects test” to determine whether personal 
jurisdiction is appropriate over entities that conduct business through eBay as a third-party 
intermediary.  When individuals and corporations conduct business through online 
intermediaries like eBay, it is especially difficult for courts to determine when a state will have 
personal jurisdiction over these entities.  The conventional problems—such as lack of territorial 
boundaries for where the online activity or effect thereof takes place, and the ability of an entity 
to make contact with every state instantaneously—are also present when entities choose to 
conduct business via online intermediaries.
81
  Additionally, since these entities do not own the 
websites through which they conduct their business, they pose separate problems for courts 
trying to apply the Zippo sliding-scale test.  Courts that have addressed the issue of whether 
personal jurisdiction exists over out-of-state defendants conducting business through online 
intermediaries usually do so in the context of breach of contract, fraud, or misrepresentation 
claims.
82
  
The archetypical eBay controversy is as follows: seller S puts a listing up on eBay 
indicating that a particular item is for sale for a particular period of time.
83
  Along with this 
listing, S provides a brief description of the item, usually indicating the quality of its condition, 
any special features the product might have, and anything else a potential buyer might wish to 
know about the product.
84
  Buyers B, C, and D, then all post “bids” on the item indicating how 
                                                 
81 See Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2004). 
82 See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1224 
(N.H. 2002).  But cf. Winfield Collection Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing 
an example of a copyright-infringement case based on an eBay transaction).  
83 See, e.g., Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009). 
84 See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014. 
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much they are willing to pay for the item.
85
  At the end of the sale period, buyer B has the 
highest bid on the item and wins the auction.
86
  S and B then arrange to have the product 
delivered to B’s home, or alternatively, B agrees to travel to the seller to pick up the item.87  
When B takes possession of the item, the product is not as B expected it to be, based on S’s 
description (or misrepresentation).
88
  B files a lawsuit against S for breach of contract (or fraud) 
in B’s home state and S argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.89  State and district 
courts throughout the United States have addressed this situation specifically, and others very 
similar to it, and have either tried to apply the traditional minimum contacts approach, the 
sliding-scale test in Zippo, or the “effects” test articulated in Calder. 
A. Courts Applying the Zippo Sliding-Scale Test  
In Dedvukaj v. Maloney, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied 
the Zippo sliding-scale test to answer the question of when personal jurisdiction is proper over an 
out-of-state defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary, such as eBay.
90
  In 
Dedvukaj, the plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, sued the defendant, a resident of New York and 
sole member of “Mr. Markdown L.L.C.,” for breach of contract after the plaintiff successfully 
bid on two pieces of artwork that defendant failed to provide.
91
  In the defendant’s listing under 
the general information heading, he listed the “item location” as “Upstate NY, United States” 
and under the “ships to” heading, he listed “United States, Canada, Europe, Asia, [and] 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App. 2006) (explaining that out of fifty-seven bids, 
plaintiff was the highest bidder).   
86 See, e.g., Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Ky. 2011).  
87 See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014 (noting that plaintiff hired a transport company to deliver car from defendant’s 
home state of Wisconsin to plaintiff’s home state of California); Metcalf, 802 A.2d at 1224 (noting that plaintiff 
buyer traveled to defendant’s home state of New Jersey to purchase excavator). 
88 See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015.  
89 See, e.g., id. at 1014; Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 
So. 2d 497, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
90 Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  
91 Id. at 816–17.  
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Australia.”92  The defendant also provided a toll-free number in the listing for interested buyers 
to call for more information.
93
  The auctions lasted for weeks, and during this time the plaintiff 
received email updates about the status of the items and the bids entered.
94
  Additionally, the 
plaintiff spoke with the defendant using the toll-free number posted on the listing about the 
authenticity of the paintings.
95
  
The court determined that Michigan’s long-arm statute allowed for jurisdiction and 
applied the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo to establish the purposeful availment prong of 
the minimum contacts analysis.
96
  The court prefaced its analysis by explaining the need for an 
expansive view of personal jurisdiction with regard to transactions through online 
intermediaries
97
:  
Internet forums such as eBay expand the seller’s market literally to the world and 
sellers know that, and avail themselves of this greatly expanded marketplace.  It 
should, in the context of these commercial relationships, be no great surprise to 
sellers—and certainly no unfair burden to them—if, when a commercial 
transaction formed over and through the internet does not meet a buyer’s 
expectations, they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in the buyer’s 
home state.  Sellers cannot expect to avail themselves of the benefit of the 
internet-created world market that they purposefully exploit and profit from 
without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities that such an expanded 
market may bring with it.
98
  
 
The court then explained why the sliding-scale test in Zippo is appropriate to establish the 
purposeful availment element of the minimum contacts test.
99
  It determined that online-
intermediary sites could be categorized as interactive, because sellers can determine the terms of 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 817. 
95 Id. at 816. 
96 Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 820.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 See id.  
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the sale and post descriptions and pictures of the items for sale.
100
  Additionally, buyers can 
communicate with other buyers and sellers by posting on the listing, and buyers make payments 
to the seller in exchange for the item.
101
 
Applying this test to the case before it, the court found that defendant had purposefully 
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in Michigan.
102
  The court 
reasoned that the defendant communicated with plaintiff frequently via email and telephone 
about the listing, uploaded pictures and descriptions of his items, indicated that he would sell 
anywhere in the United States and in many countries, accepted payment from Michigan, and was 
a sophisticated and extensive user of eBay.
103
  The court then went on to find that the remaining 
elements of the minimum contacts test were met.
104
  The court determined that the lawsuit arose 
out of and was related to the eBay transaction, and jurisdiction over the defendant was 
reasonable because the defendant’s connection with Michigan was substantial and the state had 
an interest in protecting its citizens from fraud and misrepresentation.
105
  Accordingly, the court 
found that Michigan had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
106
  
A review of other decisions where courts have applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo 
provides insight as to relevant factors that go toward determining the level of interactivity needed 
to establish the purposeful availment element and whether jurisdiction over the defendant is 
reasonable.  Federal and state courts applying the Zippo sliding-scale test to determine whether 
personal jurisdiction is appropriate in these situations have ruled both for and against 
                                                 
100 Id. at 821.  
101 Id. 
102 Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
103 Id. at 822. 
104 Id. at 823. 
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
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defendants.
107
  First, in Crummey v. Morgan, a Louisiana appellate court found that the 
defendant’s interactivity through electronic communications was sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction in Louisiana, where the defendant accepted payment from a Louisiana credit card, 
provided potential buyers with a telephone number, engaged in additional conversations with 
buyers, and used the post to “advertise, puff, negotiate, and accept payment.”108  The court also 
indicated an important public policy rationale for finding that personal jurisdiction exists over 
these defendants.
109
  The court theorized that holding otherwise would have a chilling effect on 
e-commerce because buyers, wary of having to litigate in the home courts of out-of-state sellers, 
“will refrain from purchasing goods on eBay . . . should the merchandise they considered 
purchasing be defective or otherwise not conform to the advertised online representations.”110 
Second, in Hinners v. Robey, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also applied the sliding-
scale test from Zippo, but it determined that it could not establish personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant eBay seller from Missouri.
111
  In Hinners, a Kentucky plaintiff bid on, and ultimately 
won the auction for a Cadillac Escalade that the Missouri defendant had put up for sale.
112
  The 
defendant’s listing stated that the Cadillac had no prior accident damage, no electrical problems, 
and was in good condition.
113
  The plaintiff traveled to Missouri to complete the deal and acquire 
possession of the vehicle.
114
  Shortly after returning to Kentucky with the vehicle, the plaintiff 
began having problems with the electrical system and took it to a mechanic who discovered that 
                                                 
107 See infra Part IV.A.  
108 Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
109 See id.  
110 Id.  
111 Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Ky. 2011) (the court considered the issue under both the sliding-scale 
test articulated in Zippo and under the traditional minimum contacts analysis and came to the same conclusion; 
however, for the purpose of this Part only the Zippo analysis is discussed).  
112 Id. at 893.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 894.  
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there had been extensive work done on the car due to prior collisions.
115
  The plaintiff filed suit 
against the defendant in Kentucky for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of warranty, and 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certification.
116
   
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo and found that the 
defendant did not purposefully avail himself of the privileges of Kentucky.
117
  The court 
explained that the defendant “did not limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky or target his 
advertisement to Kentucky residents, and in fact could not know the resident state of the 
successful bidder until the auction was complete.”118  It stated that the eBay listing was akin to a 
“passive Internet website” that “does little more than make information available to those who 
are interested.”119  Also relevant to its conclusion was the fact that the delivery of the item was 
concluded outside of Kentucky.
120
  Based on this analysis, the court ultimately concluded that to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be constitutionally improper.
121
  
Perhaps the most important thing to take away from these cases is their use of the sliding-
scale test to assess the purposeful availment aspect of the minimum contacts test.  As previously 
discussed in Part II, combining the analysis from McGee v. Int’l. Life Ins. Co. and Hanson v. 
Denckla, one contact may be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant if the contact is substantial, and the defendant purposefully avails himself of the 
benefits and privileges of the forum state through that contact.
122
  These cases also illustrate that 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 893.  
117 Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 901.  
120 See id. at 894 n.3 (“There is some indication in the record that delivery and execution of the paperwork may have 
occurred in Illinois; however, the relevant point is that the delivery was completed beyond the borders of Kentucky, 
and whether it was in Missouri or Illinois is of no significance.”).  
121 Id. at 903.  
122 See discussion supra Part II; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1958); Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).   
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courts can apply the Zippo sliding-scale test to transactions conducted over online intermediaries 
to establish the purposeful availment prong of the traditional minimum contacts test, while still 
maintaining the other traditional elements of establishing personal jurisdiction.
123
  Each of these 
cases also required that the claim arise out of or relate to the eBay transaction and for jurisdiction 
over the defendants to be reasonable. 
Importantly, in Hinners the court listed relevant factors in considering whether the 
defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Kentucky.
124
  The 
court stated that since the seller did not “limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky,” could not 
know that the winning bidder was a resident of the state of Kentucky, did not select the winning 
bidder, and completed the delivery outside of Kentucky, the defendant did not purposefully avail 
himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in Kentucky.
125
  Similarly, in 
Crummey the court listed relevant factors supporting its finding that the defendant had 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Louisiana.
126
  The court found that 
since the defendants expanded their market by using eBay as an intermediary, accepted an 
original down payment for the vehicle with a credit card sent from Louisiana, and provided the 
plaintiff with a telephone number to engage in additional communications about the defendant, 
they purposefully availed themselves of the protections of Louisiana law.
127
   
Again, in Dedvukaj the court also listed the factors it considered relevant to determining 
that defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and privileges of 
Michigan.
128
  In making its decision, the court considered the fact that the defendants stated that 
                                                 
123 See Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 898; Crummey 
v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 501–02 (La. Ct. App. 2007).  
124 See Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 894 n.4, 899–900.   
125 Id.  
126 See Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 504. 
127 Id.  
128 Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822.  
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they would deliver their paintings anywhere in the United States, that the defendants provided 
the plaintiff with a phone number and email address in order to contact them, and that they 
provided their own terms and conditions, logos, and marketing information in their listing.
129
  
These cases effectively illustrate which factors courts will consider as relevant to determining 
whether an out-of-state defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary has 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of a forum state in order to establish 
personal jurisdiction over that defendant.
130
  
B. Courts Applying Traditional Minimum Contacts Analysis 
Some courts, however, have refused to abandon the traditional approach in resolving the 
issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant conducting business 
through an online intermediary.  The Ninth Circuit applied traditional personal jurisdiction 
analysis in resolving this issue in Boschetto v. Hansing.
131
  In Boschetto, the plaintiff, a 
California resident, used eBay to purchase an antique car from the defendant, a resident of 
Wisconsin.
132
  The parties communicated through email and arranged to deliver the car to 
California from Wisconsin.
133
  Upon receiving the car, Boschetto realized that the car was not 
the specific “R Code” model that the defendant advertised and found other significant problems 
with the engine and body of the car.
134
  Boschetto subsequently sued defendant in California for 
breach of contract and fraud.
135
  The court expressly stated that the sliding-scale test articulated 
                                                 
129 Id.  
130 See discussion infra Part V.  
131 Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d. 1011 (9th Cir. 2008).  
132 Id. at 1014.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1015.  
135 Id. at 1014–15.  
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in Zippo was inapplicable in this type of situation because the defendant did not own or operate 
the eBay website.
136
  
The court equated the eBay listing as an advertisement, stating that “the eBay listing was 
not part of broader e-commerce activity; the listing temporarily advertised a good for sale and 
that listing closed once the item was sold, thereby extinguishing the Internet contact for this 
transaction within the forum state (and every other forum).”137  Thus, the court applied the 
traditional minimum contacts analysis articulated in International Shoe to the online transaction 
and found that defendant’s one sale over eBay to the California plaintiff was not a sufficient 
contact to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
138
  The court did 
note, however, that a defendant who conducts business over eBay might be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in a forum state when he uses eBay “as a means for establishing regular business 
with a remote forum such that finding personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.’”139 
One potential benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Boschetto is that it is consistent 
with traditional long-range transactions that do not involve the Internet, and courts can look to 
case law that addressed these situations for support and guidance as to how much contact with 
the forum state is sufficient.  The court’s holding, however, poses a number of potential 
problems as well.  First, if the defendant was actually wrong and made a number of 
misrepresentations in the description of the vehicle, the plaintiff may have no recourse, as the 
cost of traveling to Wisconsin to litigate may be too burdensome for the individual plaintiff.  
Additionally, the court failed to address the significance, if any, of the communication via email 
                                                 
136 Id. at 1018.  
137 Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018.   
138 Id. at 1020.  
139 Id. at 1019.  
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that plaintiff and defendant exchanged in arranging the delivery of the car to California and 
whether or not that communication may contribute towards the defendant’s “minimum contacts” 
with California.  
Once again, reviewing other courts that have applied the traditional minimum contacts 
tests in these types of situations reveals relevant factors that these courts consider in deciding 
whether the defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient and whether it is reasonable to 
subject the defendant to jurisdiction.  Federal and state courts in other jurisdictions following this 
approach have generally found that the contacts through the online intermediaries were 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, describing them as attenuated, random, and fortuitous.
140
  
Notably, many of these courts rely on the fact that the defendant has “no control over the 
winning bidder,” and as a result, the contact with the forum state is random and fortuitous.141  
This view, however, ignores reality.  In fact, sellers are able to control who (or at least where) 
the winning bidder will be.  Sellers are able to control the information that is posted in the 
“description” and “shipping and payments” sections of their listings on eBay.142  Sellers may 
choose which forum states they will agree to ship to and with whom they will conduct 
business.
143
  Most sellers, however, seek to maximize the number of potential buyers and 
increase the sale price of their item, intentionally choosing to avail themselves of the benefits of 
conducting business with every state.   
                                                 
140 See, e.g., Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Foley v. Yacht 
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 
N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).   
141 See Payment & Shipping, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/shipping-costs.html (last visited Mar. 11, 
2013).  
142 See id.  
143 See id. 
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At least one court has applied the traditional minimum contacts test to an out-of-state 
defendant conducting business over eBay and found that personal jurisdiction was appropriate.
144
  
In Malcolm v. Esposito, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, won an auction to purchase a car on 
eBay from defendant agents of a car dealership located in Connecticut.
145
  After the auction 
ended, the parties contacted each other by email and phone and the defendants arranged to ship 
the car from California to Virginia.
146
  Before the defendants shipped the car, the plaintiff 
discovered a manufacturing defect with the car and tried to cancel his purchase of the vehicle, 
but the defendants refused to allow the plaintiff to revoke the agreement.
147
  The plaintiff 
subsequently sued the defendants in Virginia for fraud and breach of warranty.
148
  
The court first concluded that the Virginia long-arm statute allowed the court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the defendant because the “formation of the contract for sale of the [car] 
occurred in Virginia.”149  Turning to the constitutional inquiry, the court found that the Zippo 
sliding-scale analysis was not “particularly instructive” because it primarily dealt with 
defendants who operate and conduct transactions through their own website.
150
  Accordingly, the 
court applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis.
151
  The court listed several factors that 
were relevant to its decision: (1) the defendants were commercial sellers of the item and had 
conducted over 213 transactions to many different states through eBay; (2) the defendants 
represented that they had eBay customers locally, nationally, and internationally; (3) the 
defendants anticipated transactions with out-of-state buyers because they sent an email to the 
                                                 
144 Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003). 
145 Id. at 441.  
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 442–43 (“The Virginia long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part, that “(A) A court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s . . . (2) 
Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth.”). 
150 Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 445.  
151 Id. at 444–46. 
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plaintiffs requesting a copy of the plaintiff’s driver’s license if he was an out-of-state resident; 
and (4) the nature of the product, an automobile, was intended to be delivered to and driven in 
Virginia.
152
  Based on an analysis of these factors under the traditional minimum contacts test, 
the court found that jurisdiction over the defendant in Virginia was proper.
153
   
C. Courts Applying the Calder Effects Test   
At least one court has attempted to apply an “effects” test similar to the one in Calder to 
determinations of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business over 
online intermediaries.
154
  In Erwin v. Piscitello, the plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, purchased 
a classic automobile advertised as being in “mint condition” from the defendant, a resident of 
Texas.
155
  The plaintiff and the defendant made and received several calls about the car, during 
which the defendant reinforced the quality and condition of the car.
156
  The defendant ultimately 
delivered the car to the plaintiff in Tennessee through his own driver and car hauler.
157
  Two 
days after the plaintiff received the car, he discovered it was not in mint condition and several of 
the original parts had been replaced, contrary to the defendant’s representations.158   
The court first explained that Tennessee’s long-arm statute allowed for personal 
jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution and as a result 
merged the constitutional and statutory analyses.
159
  The court then applied an effects test and 
concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of 
                                                 
152 Id. at 446.  
153 Id. at 444, 446.  
154 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
155 Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856–57 (E.D. Tenn. 2007). 
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Tennessee’s laws.160  The court found that the defendant “knowingly interacted with a Tennessee 
resident” and persuaded the plaintiff to purchase the vehicle based on representations about the 
vehicle that were ultimately discovered to be untrue.
161
  In doing so, the court emphasized that 
“[the defendant’s] knowing and intentional conduct caused foreseeable ill effects in-state.”162  
Based on these factual determinations, the court concluded that it was “reasonably foreseeable 
for Defendant to be haled into court in Tennessee when the transaction soured.”163  
Most courts have chosen not to discuss whether an “effects test” is applicable in the 
context of Internet transactions through online intermediaries like eBay.
164
  Instead, these courts 
have chosen to address this issue under the Zippo sliding-scale analysis or under the traditional 
minimum contacts analysis.
165
  At least one court has explicitly declined to follow the analysis 
set forth in Erwin in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary.
166
  Additionally, the court in 
MacNeil v. Trambert discussed the difficulty of trying to apply the effects doctrine to Internet 
transactions over online intermediaries like eBay.
167
  First, the court indicated that the “effects 
doctrine” is generally applied to intentional tort cases, and thus is inapplicable to breach-of-
contract cases in the eBay context.
168
  This means that the effects test would only be applicable 
to fraud and misrepresentation cases.
169
  Next, the court pointed out the difficulty in establishing 
the location of the tortious act in a multi-state transaction, whether it occurs when the defendant 
                                                 
160 Id. at 860. 
161 Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860. 
162 Id. at 861.  
163 Id.  
164 See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 
813, 819–21 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–04 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
165 See supra Part IV.A–B. 
166 See Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Ky. 2011).  
167 See MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 447–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  
168 Id. at 447.  
169 Id.  
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accepts payment for the defective good or when the plaintiff obtains possession of the defective 
good.
170
  Consequently, if the plaintiff chooses to pick up the defective good in the defendant’s 
state, or authorizes an agent to do so, the location of the acceptance of payment and deliverance 
of possession would both be in the defendant’s state.171  As a result, the plaintiff would have no 
recourse in his own state and would have to travel to the defendant’s state to file his lawsuit.   
Currently, Erwin is the only case that has used the “effects test” to find personal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through online intermediaries.  
Although it is only one case, Erwin illustrates that an effects test remains a viable option for 
courts to consider in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over an individual who 
conducts business over eBay or some other online intermediary.  But as the court in MacNeil 
pointed out, applying this test in the context of Internet transactions over online intermediaries 
can be problematic.  Until courts adopt a more uniform standard for establishing personal 
jurisdiction under these circumstances, courts will continue to struggle in determining which 
analysis to apply and which factors are relevant to assessing the reasonableness of jurisdiction.   
V. The “Online Intermediaries Test” 
A review of the existing commentary on this issue illustrates that, just like the courts, 
scholars and commentators disagree about what the proper test should be under these 
circumstances.
172
  Some commentators argue that courts should stick to the traditional minimum 
contacts analysis for long-range transactions and not get distracted by the fact that the business 
was conducted over the Internet on the eBay website.
173
  One commentator suggested that state 
                                                 
170 See id. at 447–48. 
171 See id. at 448.  
172 See discussion infra Part V. 
173 See, e.g., Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts Analysis—Ninth Circuit Holds That Single Sale on EBay 
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legislatures amend their respective state’s long-arm statutes to preclude personal jurisdiction 
over out-of-state residents who conduct business over third-party websites such as eBay and 
Amazon.
174
  Some other commentators have suggested that general jurisdiction could apply to 
the actual websites of eBay or Amazon.
175
  In line with this argument is the question of whether 
these websites’ most prominent users could also be subject to general jurisdiction if through 
these online intermediaries, they have continuous and systematic contacts with every state in the 
United States.  This would mean that jurisdiction would be proper over these “super-sellers” in 
any state where a buyer files a claim against them.  No commentator, however, has argued in 
favor of creating a specific test for online intermediaries by incorporating a modification of the 
Zippo sliding-scale test along with elements of the traditional minimum contacts test.  
An analysis of the relevant case law on establishing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants who conduct business through online intermediaries makes clear that the best test for 
establishing personal jurisdiction is one that combines and implements the most important 
elements of the prevalent cases.
176
  The following online-intermediary test combines many 
elements from the cases previously mentioned.
177
  First, it applies principles from the Zippo 
sliding-scale test and looks at the interactivity and features of the bid, post, or listing on the 
online intermediary to determine whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the 
forum state.
178
  Then, it maintains the requirements of the minimum contacts test that the conflict 
must (1) arise out of or relate to the transaction; and (2) that jurisdiction over the defendant must 
be reasonable.
179
  
                                                 
174 Ryan T. Holte, What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
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176 See discussion supra Parts IV.A–C. 
177 See discussion supra Part IV.  
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The most fluent articulation of this test, derived from Dedvukaj,
180
 Hinners,
181
 and 
Crummey
182
 is as follows: an out-of-state defendant who conducts business over a third-party 
intermediary, such as eBay or Amazon, is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state when: 
(1) that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts whereby he purposefully avails himself of the 
benefits and privileges of the state as determined by the level of interactivity available to 
potential buyers in the forum state through the listing; (2) the claim against him arises out of 
those contacts; and (3) after an analysis of the relevant factors, jurisdiction over the defendant is 
reasonable such that it complies with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  
The unique aspect of this approach derives from determining whether the defendant purposefully 
avails himself of the forum state by looking at the interactivity of the post or listing on the online 
intermediary itself.  As previously mentioned, eBay users and users of similar online 
intermediaries have a significant amount of control over the information they post in their listing 
and how the transaction is ultimately concluded.
183
  The more passive the seller is in posting 
information, arranging for shipping, and soliciting potential buyers in various states through his 
or her listing, the less likely the defendant will have purposefully availed himself of a forum state 
where his product is ultimately sold and vice versa.  
In all of the cases where courts have struggled to determine whether personal jurisdiction 
can be established over an out-of-state defendant that conducts business through an online 
intermediary, these courts have mentioned several factors that are considered relevant to the 
inquiry.
184
  After reviewing these cases, it is now possible to determine which factors courts cite 
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Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).   
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most frequently and give the most weight to in reviewing this issue.  These factors are intended 
to serve as a guide for future courts reviewing this issue.  Courts that have applied one of the 
three articulated personal jurisdiction tests have come to different conclusions in factually similar 
cases because they differ on one or two of the factors listed below.
185
   
The following factors that courts should consider in determining whether the defendant’s 
bid is sufficiently interactive such that he or she purposefully avails himself or herself of the 
forum state are: (1) the number of transactions between the seller and the forum state through the 
online intermediary;
186
 (2) whether and to what extent the defendant coordinates and pays for the 
product to be shipped to the buyer’s home state, physically or through an agent who delivers the 
product to the buyer’s state, or whether the defendant requires the buyer to come to the 
defendant’s state to take possession of the product;187 (3) whether the defendant posts contact 
information such as an email address, website, or telephone number in the bid and intends to 
make contact with buyers in the forum state in ways other than through the listing on the 
intermediary;
188
  (4) whether the defendant knows the buyer’s location, establishing that he has 
knowledge that he is conducting business with the forum state;
189
 and (5) whether the defendant 
is an individual or corporation who frequently conducts business through online 
intermediaries.
190
  Courts addressing the issue of out-of-state defendants conducting business 
through online intermediaries have cited these factors most frequently as relevant to its 
determination of personal jurisdiction.  
                                                 
185 See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–20; Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 819–
21; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899–902; MacNeil, 932 N.E.2d at 446–47; Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503–04; Malcolm, 
63 Va. Cir. at 446 (2003).   
186 See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 902.   
187 See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822. 
188 See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; MacNeil, 932 N.E.2d at 447; Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503–04. 
189 See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503; 
Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446. 
190 See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446. 
30 
 
The “reasonableness” element of the test is also an important inquiry that courts should 
not overlook.  The online-intermediaries test borrows the traditional factors from World-Wide 
Volkswagen in determining whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable as to 
comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”191  These factors 
include: (1) the burden litigation will have on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in the 
litigation; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and (4) the national judicial interest in 
securing an efficient resolution of the dispute.
192
  The value of the product that forms the basis of 
the transaction should also be relevant to this inquiry.  The statutory requirement that a matter 
must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity jurisdiction will prevent many claims from reaching 
federal courts; however, state courts should be hesitant to require a defendant to travel across the 
country to defend himself over an inexpensive contract dispute.
193
 
VI. Applying the Online Intermediaries Test in Real and Hypothetical Scenarios 
The following example illustrates the practicality and feasibility of the online-
intermediaries test.  Consider the facts of Erwin v. Piscitello.
194
  The issue of whether personal 
jurisdiction exists over the defendant in Erwin can be resolved with the same outcome under the 
online-intermediaries test.  In Erwin, the plaintiff viewed the defendant’s eBay post for a car for 
sale and used the information in the post to email the defendant to inquire about that car, to 
which the defendant responded.
195
  Had that been the full extent of the defendant’s 
communications with the plaintiff, he would not have purposefully availed himself of Tennessee 
law under the online-intermediaries test.  The defendant, however, chose to re-initiate contact 
with the plaintiff and sent a number of emails and phone calls to the plaintiff seeking to gauge 
                                                 
191 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id.  
193 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
194 See supra Part IV.C. 
195 Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).   
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his interest in the car.
196
  Additionally, when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff would 
not be able to pick the car up in Texas as previously believed, the defendant arranged for a car 
hauler to deliver the car to the plaintiff’s home in Tennessee.197  From the communications and 
the fact that the seller arranged to deliver the car to Tennessee, it is evident that the defendant 
knew he was dealing with a plaintiff from Tennessee.
198
   
Based on these facts, the defendant in Erwin purposefully availed himself of the benefits 
and privileges of Tennessee by interacting with the plaintiff buyer on multiple levels.  The next 
inquiry about whether the claim arises out of the transaction is easily satisfied because the claim 
arises out of the dispute over the condition of the car.
199
  Finally, looking at whether jurisdiction 
over the defendant would be reasonable, the facts show that Tennessee has a strong interest in 
protecting its citizens from fraudulent misrepresentations, that the defendant was easily able to 
secure transportation for the car to Tennessee, and that the car was worth $50,000.
200
  As a result, 
under the online-intermediaries test, personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the dispute 
regarding the car would be appropriate in Tennessee.  
  An alternative hypothetical example illustrates when personal jurisdiction would not be 
appropriate over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through an online intermediary.  
Suppose a seller lists a bullwhip
201
 on eBay that Harrison Ford used to portray the character 
“Indiana Jones” in the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.202  The defendant is a resident of New 
Jersey, an attorney by profession, and has only used eBay once before to sell his mother’s fine 
china to a buyer from New York.  In his eBay listing, he includes a brief description of the whip, 
                                                 
196 Id. at 857. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 860.  
200 See id. at 856. 
201 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 151 (10th ed. 1998) (A bullwhip is “a rawhide whip with a very 
long plaited lash”).  
202 RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981).  
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indicating that Harrison Ford used it in the film and stating that the buyer is responsible for 
pickup or delivery and must pay all shipping costs from New Jersey.  The potential buyer is an 
avid movie buff who lives in Idaho and is always on the lookout for movie relics on eBay and 
other auction sites.  The buyer sees the listing and decides he must have the whip.  The buyer 
then submits a bid for $15,000 and after one week, he wins the auction.  When the buyer receives 
the whip, he questions its authenticity by watching the movie with his whip in hand.  The buyer 
brings a lawsuit against the seller in Idaho for breach of contract and fraud based on the alleged 
misrepresentations in the eBay listing. 
Through an application of the online intermediaries test, a court in Idaho would not be 
able to establish personal jurisdiction over the seller.  The seller never made a sale to Idaho 
through eBay before, and his previous sale of fine china to New York is not sufficient to 
establish that the he is engaged in the business of selling movie relics or fine dishware through 
online auction sites.  The seller did not post any contact information in the bid indicating that he 
would attempt to contact individuals by other methods other than through the eBay listing. 
Additionally, he indicated that the plaintiff was responsible for the pickup or delivery and 
subsequent costs of the item from New Jersey.  Even though the seller chose not to limit his sale 
to any specific state but instead allowed his bullwhip to be sold anywhere in the United States, 
this factor alone is not sufficient to overcome the other factors that indicate he has not 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Idaho.  Thus, through this passive 
conduct, the seller never purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of 
conducting business in Idaho, and therefore, he cannot reasonably expect to be haled into court 
in Idaho to defend against this lawsuit.  
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These examples show that courts can practically apply the online-intermediaries test to 
different factual scenarios involving transactions conducted over eBay or other online 
intermediaries with relative uniformity.  The more sellers choose to engage buyers in a particular 
forum state through their listing and communication and negotiation outside of the listing, the 
more likely they will be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.  Conversely, the more 
passive they are in listing and soliciting communication and interest from potential buyers 
outside of the posts by only responding to buyer inquiries, the less likely they will be subject to 
personal jurisdiction.  This test still allows sellers to exploit the benefits of selling their products 
through an online intermediary such as eBay and to protect themselves from liability in a foreign 
jurisdiction.  It provides, however, that if they choose to actively solicit and target customers in a 
foreign state or conduct a significant amount of business with a foreign state through that 
intermediary, then they cannot claim that it is unreasonable for them to be called into court in 
that state.  As a result, this online intermediaries test strikes an appropriate balance of 
reasonableness and fairness.   
VII. Conclusion 
Upon reviewing the relevant case law regarding personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants who conduct business with the forum state over online intermediaries, it is clear that 
there is a lack of uniformity amongst courts.  Notably, almost all courts have maintained some or 
all of the elements of the traditional minimum contacts analysis for determining personal 
jurisdiction in these cases.
203
  Some courts have maintained all of the elements from 
International Shoe Co. and applied them to these situations, with the majority of these courts 
                                                 
203 See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 
855, 860–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 446–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Malcolm v. 
Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).   
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finding that one or two sales with the forum state is insufficient to establish minimum contacts to 
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant seller.
204
  Others have applied the sliding-scale 
test in Zippo based on the interactivity of the commercial business to satisfy the purposeful 
availment element of the minimum contacts analysis.
205
  These courts have found both for and 
against establishing personal jurisdiction over these defendants based on the level of interactivity 
they provide in their listings and advertisements.  One court has found that if the actions of these 
defendants conducting business through these online intermediaries caused an effect in the forum 
state, then even one contact with the forum state might be sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction.
206
  
This Comment argues for an analytical test, which combines the two major approaches to 
this issue.  Courts should apply the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo to determine whether 
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state 
through his contacts of the sale listing.  Next, courts should determine whether the claim arises 
out of, or relates to, the contact.  Finally, these courts should determine whether jurisdiction over 
the defendant would be reasonable such that it would comply with “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice” based on the factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen.207 
Courts and commentators have struggled with the issue of how to assert personal 
jurisdiction over individuals who conduct business over online intermediaries since immediately 
after the creation and increase in popularity of third-party intermediary sites like eBay and 
Amazon.  This approach is a push toward uniformity in an area of much disparity and 
                                                 
204 See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at 
*3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); Winfield Collection Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 748–49 (E.D. Mich. 
2000); Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 444–46. 
205 See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 821–22 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 
1221, 1225–27 (N.H. 2002); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 
So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
206 Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–62.  
207 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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disagreement.  This “online intermediaries test” seeks to provide guidelines for buyers and 
sellers conducting business over online intermediaries to know exactly where they may be called 
upon to address issues with regard to their purchases and sales in a court of law.   
